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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH IRENE REISER, by 
and through her Guardian, 
RICHARD E. REISER and 
ELEANOR REISER, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
RICHARD LOHNER and HOWARD 
FRANCIS, Medical Doctors, 
and PROVO OBSTETRICAL AND 
GYNECOLOGY CLINIC, INC., 
a Professional corporation, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
) 
Case No. 16,444 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendants agree generally with the Statement of- the 
Kind of Case as set forth in the plaintiffs' Brief, denying, 
however, any malpractice in the treatment of Eleanor Reiser 
during her pregnancy with Elizabeth. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendants agree generally with the plaintiffs' 
discussion of the Disposition in the Lower Court in plaintiffs' 
Brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Judgments entered and the Rulings made by the 
District Court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants do not agree with many of the facts or the 
interpretation of facts as set forth in plaintiffs' Brief. 
-1-
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Defendants agree that Richard and Eleanor Reiser had u 
Rh incompatibility and that Eleanor Reiser was Rh sensitized. Rh 
sensitivity is the development of antibodies in an Rh negative 
mother which occurs at the time of delivery of the first Rh posi-
tive baby. The antibodies are then present thereafter to affect 
future Rh positive babies, by actually crossing the placental 
barrier and attaching themselves to the red blood cells of the 
fetus ultimately causing destruction of those cells. 
During the pregnancy of the fifth child, David, defen-
dant Dr. Howard Francis induced labor at 38 weeks of pregnancy 
because of Rh sensitization and because of emotional and physical 
upset of the patient Mrs. Reiser. (R. 1135, 1394, 1507, 1726) 
Dr. Francis had determined that induction of labor was a suitable 
alternative to leaving the fetus in the womb inasmuch as the cer· 
vix was soft and effaced or thinning out, which made the con-
ditions favorable for induction. (R. 1726) 
In the latter part of 1970, and the early part of 1971, 
Mrs. Reiser was in her sixth pregnancy. By this time, defendants 
had developed a rotation system for seeing patients, which 
allowed the patient to become acquainted and familiar with each 
of the physicians in the clinic who might be called upon to 
deliver the patient's child. 
Dr. Lobner first saw Mrs. Reiser at the defendants' 
medical clinic on June 24, 1971, which was approximately the 38~ 
week of pregnancy. At the time of this visit, Dr. Lehner 
reviewed the clinical charts for Mrs. Reiser and learned that sM 
was Rh negative. (R. 1503) 
-2-
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During the course of the June 24, 1971 examination, a 
"titer test" was performed, which was an evaluation of a sample of 
Mrs. Reiser's blood. The titer test is simply a measurement of 
the level of Rh sensitivity in the mother, and is not an accurate 
measurement of the status or involvement of the fetus. For 
example, it is possible to have a rather significant titer 
reading, meaning there is a high level of sensitivity, but the 
fetus itself may be Rh negative and not in danger from the 
mother's antibodies, or Rh positive but not affected to the point 
of danger. (R. 1311-1333, 1429, 1510-1511) This was the first 
titer test taken on this pregnancy. 
The June 24th test results were received by Dr. Lehner 
on June 26, 1971. (R. 1507-1508, plaintiffs' Exhibit 6) The 
test of 1:128 revealed a significant titer, indicating the possi-
bility that the fetus was in some danger, depending again on the 
individual capability of this infant to resist the antibodies. 
Mrs. Reiser was asked to come in that same day, June 26, 1971, to 
discuss the options available to properly care for the mother and 
child. One of the options discussed was to induce labor, which 
Dr. Lehner would have preferred if the conditions were favorable. 
(R. 1236-1237) Dr. Lehner explained to Mrs. Reiser that the 
fetus may be severely involved with the Rh problem and that 
induction would be the best route to take, but that he wanted to 
do a vaginal examination to assess the status of the cervix and 
determine whether conditions were favorable for induction. 
(R. 1511-1516) 
The examination revealed that the conditions were not 
favorable for induction inasmuch as the cervix was "thick and 
-3-
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firm", rather than soft and effaced as in the fifth pregnancy 
where labor was induced. (R. 1511-1512) As induction of labor 
was further discussed, Mrs. Reiser reported that she had had two 
prior inductions and that they were the worst experiences she had 
ever had and if there was another alternative, she would like ~ 
take a chance on waiting for the natural delivery of the child, 
(R. 1138, 1517) 
Dr. Lobner then explained to Mrs. Reiser that an 
amniocentesis could be performed to more accurately determine the 
status of the baby. The amniocentesis procedure as explained to 
Mrs. Reiser requires the insertion of a needle probe and the 
extraction of sample fluid from the amniotic sac. The level of 
the baby's involvement with the Rh factor is measured quan-
titatively by an analysis of the amount of bilirubin in the 
amniotic fluid. The more elevated the bilirubin level becomes, 
the greater danger to the baby. 
Once the involvement of the fetus is determined, the 
future management of the Rh factor can be decided. If the fetus 
is severely involved and incapable of surviving, the obstetrici~ 
can induce labor or take the child by cesarean section unless the 
infant is not mature enough to exist outside the environment of 
the uterus, in which event an intra-uterine transfusion can be 
given. If the involvement of the fetus is not severe, then ~e 
pregnancy will be allowed to continue. 
Dr. Lobner explained to Mrs. Reiser the usual complic~ 
tions and risks that are associated with the amniocentesis 
including sticking the baby with the needle and inducing infec-
-4-
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tion within the uterus. (R. 1518) 
Mrs. Reiser was aware that if the Rh incompatibility was 
bad enough in this pregnancy that it could cause very severe 
damage to the baby, (R. 1138), and realizing that, she decided 
and agreed with Dr. Lobner that an amniocentesis would be a 
suitable alternative so as to more accurately determine the 
status of the baby. (R. 1519) 
Mrs. Reiser was then prepared for the amniocentesis and 
or. Lohner took the patient's blood pressure and found it to be 
within the normal range, although he did not record the blood 
pressure reading because of the unexpected occurrences after the 
amniocentesis. (R. 1522) 
Mrs. Reiser was placed on her back for the amniocentesis. 
During the procedure Mrs. Reiser did not appear to be in any 
distress, was not perspiring and did not complain of any 
problems. (R. 1197-1198, 1527-1528) 
Following the amniocentesis, Dr. Lobner left the exami-
nation room, leaving Mrs. Reiser in the care of his registered 
nurse, Grace Nielsen. Mrs. Nielsen asked Mrs. Reiser how she 
felt, and Mrs. Reiser responded by saying, "I feel fine." The 
nurse then obtained for Mrs. Reiser a glass of water from the 
lab, and as Mrs. Reiser was raising up to drink the water, she 
suddenly said, "Don't let me fall" and began to get pale as if 
she were going to faint. Mrs. Nielsen then reassured Mrs. Reiser 
that she would not let her fall and tried to get the table back 
down. She then called for the other nurse, Delores Bahr, to come 
in and assist her in getting the table down. (R. 1181-1182, 
1205-1206) The testimony differs from that point on whether 
_c;_ 
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Mrs. Bahr or Mrs. Nielsen went to obtain some smelling salts 
while the other nurse stayed with Mrs. Reiser. Mrs. Bahr remem-
bers that she could not find the smelling salts and that she 
stayed with Mrs. Reiser while Mrs. Nielsen went to find them. At 
this point Mrs. Bahr said Mrs. Reiser was lying on her right side 
facing Mrs. Bahr. (R. 1607-1608) As Mrs. Bahr looked at 
Mrs. Reiser she suddenly noticed that her color was dark so she 
called Dr. Lobner who immediately came into the examining room 
and made the diagnosis of cardiac arrest and started his resu~~ 
tative efforts. (R. 1608) 
Dr. Lobner immediately gave Mrs. Reiser a big thump on 
the chest, established an airway, began mouth-to-mouth respira-
tions and closed chest cardiac massage. He asked his nurse Grace 
Nielsen to contact an internist and have him meet them at the 
hospital. He asked the other nurse Delores Bahr to call the 
ambulance. (R. 1208, 1609) 
Dr. Lobner continued his resuscitative efforts after the 
ambulance arrived and he was with Mrs. Reiser until they arrived at 
the hospital at 11:40 a.m., which was approximately ten minutes 
after Dr. Lobner had first diagnosed the cardiac arrest. 
(R. 1541) Resuscitation efforts continued at the hospital. The 
cardiac arrest was diagnosed as "ventricular fibrillation". 
On the following morning after the cardiac arrest, 
June 27, 1971, plaintiff Eleanor Reiser gave birth to Elizabeth. 
The labor was probably induced by the shock and trauma associated 
with the cardiac arrest. (R. 1697) 
the child had severe brain damage. 
-6-
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including both expert witnesses produced by plaintiffs, agreed 
that the cause of the infant's brain damage was "anoxia", which 
is a lack of oxygen to the infant's brain resulting from the car-
diac arrest. (R. 1054, 1285-1286, 1318, 1428) Every physician 
agreed that the brain damage had nothing to do with the Rh factor 
or with the attack of the mother's antibodies upon the infant's 
blood. (R. 1057, 1428) 
At some time on June 26, 1971, subsequent to the cardiac 
arrest, the serum obtained through the amniocentesis test was 
sent by Dr. Lohner's staff to the lab for analysis. The result 
was a finding of .03, which is in the "moderate" range. After 
the infant was born, the reports of the pediatrician reveal again 
only a moderate involvement with the Rh factor, and all of this 
indicated to each physician who testified that the baby's brain 
damage was not in any way related to the Rh factor. (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 6; R. 1050-1057; First Transcript of Proceedings, 
pp. 120-121, 576) 
Plaintiffs' experts testified that the probable cause of 
the cardiac arrest which produced the anoxia causing the infant's 
brain damage, was a condition known as "supine hypotensive 
syndrome." This is a condition caused by depression of the vena 
cava vein by the uterus together with insufficient collateral 
circulation, which has been reported to cause some discomfort, 
nausea, sweating and other similar signs and symptoms. 
(R. 1318-1322, 1399-1400, 1409-1410, 1695) Although a few women 
in the late stages of pregnancy may develop a supine hypotensive 
syndrome, all of the physicians, including plaintiffs' experts, 
agreed that never in medical history had it been reported that 
-7-
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this condition led to a cardiac arrest. (R. 1294-1296, 
1364-1369, 1412, 1418, 1685-1687, 1812) 
Because the infant's brain damage was not in any way a 
result of the Rh factor and because plaintiffs' theory of negli· 
gence against the doctors related to leaving the patient on her 
back too long resulting in supine hypotensive syndrome, the trial 
court excluded the evidence of a failure to take a titer test a~ 
an amniocentesis prior to June 26, 1971, which would have been 
expected as part of the normal treatment given to an Rh sen-
sitized pregnant woman. 
The case was submitted to the jury on the questions of 
whether Dr. Lohner was negligent in allowing Mrs. Reiser to lie 
on her back for an excessive period of time, and whether 
Dr. Lehner was negligent in the resuscitative efforts used to 
revive Mrs. Reiser. The jury answered "no" to both questions and 
the court entered a judgment of no cause of action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING 
EVIDENCE THAT A TITER TEST WAS NOT TAKEN 
AND THAT AN AMNIOCENTESIS WAS NOT GIVEN 
PRIOR TO JUNE 26, 1971. 
Defendants filed a Motion in Limine prior to trial to 
exclude evidence that a titer test was not taken nor was an 
amniocentesis given to Mrs. Reiser prior to June 26, 1971. 
Defendants contended that such evidence was not relevant or 
material to the issues because there was no causal connnection 
between these omissions and the brain damage, and that the 
admission of this irrelevant or minimally probative evidence 
-8-
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would be highly and unfairly prejudicial to defendants. 
Defendants' motion was granted. 
The question of whether to exclude evidence is always at 
least a two-step analysis for the trial court. The evidence must 
first be "relevant" and if it is determined that it is 
•relevant", then it must be asked whether it should be excluded 
under some other rule, such as the prejudicial impact the evi-
dence may have as weighed against its probative value. See 
Byers v. Santiam Ford, Inc., 574 P.2d 1122 (Ore. 1978), and Utah 
Rules of Evidence 1. (2), and 45. 
A. Evidence That The Earlier Tests Were Not Performed Is 
Not Relevant Or Material Because These Omissions Were Not A 
Proximate Cause Of Plaintiff's Injuries. 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (U.R.E.) states 
that "except as otherwise provided • • • all relevant evidence is 
admissible." The implication of Rule 7 is that the evidence must 
first be "relevant" in order to be admissible and secondly, the 
relevant evidence itself may be inadmissible because of some 
other rule. 
Relevant evidence is defined by Rule 1. (2) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence as follows: 
• evidence having any tendency in 
reason to prove or disprove the existence 
of any material fact. (Emphasis added) 
The evidence of the omission of the earlier tests in the 
instant case may be proof of the fact that the tests were not 
performed and that the management of this Rh sensitized pregnancy 
was not adequate, but such evidence is not "material" to the 
-9-
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issues in the lawsuit because the Rh factor had nothing to do 
with the infant's brain damage. Consequently the trial court 
excluded the failure to take the earlier tests, reasoning that 
such omissions could not have been a cause or a proximate cause 
of plaintiff's injuries and therefore such evidence was irrele-
vant and immaterial or of little probative value. Clearly the 
decision to exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court judge. Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.~ 
1139 (Utah 1977), State v. Minnish, 560 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977), 
There is no dispute in this case that the Rh factor d~ 
not contribute to the infant plaintiff's brain damage, and that 
the actual cause of the brain injury was "anoxia", which result~ 
from lack of oxygen to the brain cells of the infant during the 
cardiac arrest. Plaintiffs' experts both testified to this fact. 
(R. 1318, 1428) 
Furthermore, it is plaintiff's position that the cardiac 
arrest, which then led to the infant's brain damage, was caused 
by leaving Mrs. Reiser on her back too long which resulted in 
"supine hypotensive syndrome". (R. 1318-1319, 1401) This 
syndrome is totally unrelated to the Rh factor. 
1. The Jury Has Removed A Vital Link In Plaintiffs' 
Chain Of Causation. 
In an effort to ?ttach liability from the test 
omissions, plaintiffs argue a chain of causation something like 
the following: The earlier tests were not performed and con-
sequently Dr. Lobner performed an amniocentesis at 38 weeks 
pregnancy, and that such act, which was not necessary, resulted 
in Mrs. Reiser lying flat on her back, and that defendants were 
-10-
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negligent in allowing Mrs. Reiser to stay on her back, which then 
led to a condition known as supine hypotensive syndrome, which 
then led to ventricular fibrillation, which then led to the 
anoxia or lack of oxygen to the infant's brain cells, thereby 
causing the brain damage to the infant. 
One obvious problem with this theory is that a vital 
link in plaintiffs' "chain" of causation has already been removed 
by the jury. The jury has definitely decided that Dr. Lohner was 
not negligent in allow{ng Mrs. Reiser to stay on her back for an 
excessive period of time. The jury obviously felt that Mrs. 
Reiser did not suffer from supine hypotensive syndrome, or that 
the syndrome was not the cause of the cardiac arrest, or that 
such a possibility was simply not foreseeable to a reasonable 
physician. In any case, if the failure to perform the earlier 
tests somehow contributed to the decision to place Mrs. Reiser on 
her back, such omissions cannot be a proximate cause of the 
infant's brain damage because the causal connection has been 
severed. Even if plaintiffs could feasibly present a "chain of 
causation" prior to the jury verdict, such an effort now appears 
"moot" in light of the verdict. 
2. The Reason Mrs. Reiser was On Her Back Is Not 
Relevant Or causally Related To The Infant's Brain Damage. 
Even if plaintiffs' argument wasn't moot, plaintiff's 
causation argument is something like saying that going for a walk 
on a Sunday afternoon was the proximate cause of an auto-
pedestrian accident. The first event is merely a condition 
making injury possible from later intervening events. 
_,,_ 
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It is admitted by plaintiffs that performing the 
' 
amniocentesis procedure itself, i.e. insertion of the needle in 
the abdomen--had nothing to do with the arrest. On the contrary, 
it is plaintiffs' claim that leaving Mrs. Reiser on her back too 
long caused the supine hypotensive syndrome which in turn caused 
the arrest. The amniocentesis was simply the reason under the 
facts of this case for Mrs. Reiser being on her back. She cou~ 
have been on her back for a myriad of reasons--during a vaginal 
examination, while sleeping, during a routine pre-natal 
examination, while her blood pressure was being taken, for induc· 
tion of labor and for many other purposes. 
Since being left on her back too long is the thrust of 
plaintiffs' claim of negligence, the reason for putting her on 
her back can have nothing to do with causing the arrest, even if 
the amniocentesis was unnecessary or contraindicated. 
If doing the amniocentesis at 38 weeks, whether· it was 
contraindicated or not, had nothing to do with causing the 
arrest, how can the failure to do prior titers and amniocentesis, 
even if they should have been done, have anything to do with the 
real issue in this case; namely, was Mrs. Reiser left on her back 
too long, and did that cause the cardiac arrest? 
Plaintiffs argue that this particular amniocentesis 
should not have been performed and that labor should have been 
induced because of the unavailability of data from omitted 
earlier tests. (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 13-14, R. 1073) If labor 
had been induced, Mrs. Reiser would have been put on her back for 
that reason, which according to plaintiff was medically indicat~ 
and in accordance with good medical practice. Had this been ~M 
-12- ... 
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and Mrs. Reiser developed a cardiac arrest because of being left 
on her back too long, plaintiffs would be claiming negligence, 
not because of the reason she was placed on her back, i.e. to 
induce labor, but because she was left there too long. 
The reason for placing Mrs. Reiser on her back whether 
performing a medically indicated procedure--induction of labor--
or a procedure that was not medically indicated-- amniocentesis 
at 38 weeks--is immaterial. In either case they are simply con-
ditions by which plaintiffs' claim of injury was possible through 
later intervening circumstances. 
In Hunt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 448 P.2d 1018 
(Okla. 1968), the plaintiff contended that certain defects were 
present in a tire manufactured by the defendant, such that those 
defects constituted a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries 
that he suffered from an automobile accident some 8,000 miles 
after the tire was sold. The court, in holding for the 
defendant, stated: 
It is our op1n1on that the scratches or 
cuts upon the side of the tire merely 
constituted a condition by which an 
injury was possible ••.. 
* * * The proximate cause of any injury must be 
the efficient cause which sets in motion 
the chain of circumstances leading to the 
injuries; if the negligence complained of 
merely furnished a condition by which the 
injury was possible and a subsequent 
independent act caused the injury, the 
existence of such condition is not the 
proximate cause of the injury. 448 P.2d 
at 1023. 
See also Stevenson v. Kansas City, 360 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1961), and 
Girard v. Monrovia City School District, 264 P.2d 115 (Cal. App. 
-13-
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1953). 
3. The Injury To Plaintiff Was Not Reasonably 
Foreseeable. 
One further reason why the omitted tests in the instant 
case cannot be a "proximate cause" of plaintiff's injuries is 
that any intervening act in the chain of causation that is not 
"reasonably foreseeable" will supersede and cut off the chain ~ 
causation. Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed., p. 272; Hillyard v. 
Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 149-151. 
It is undisputed from all of the testimony in this case 
that a cardiac arrest has never in medical history resulted fr~ 
an amniocentesis procedure. (R. 1412) Further, it is undisputed' 
that never in medical history has it been reported that a woman ~ 
in the late stages of pregnancy and who has not been given a 
regional anesthesia suffered from supine hypotensive syndrome 
that went on to develop into a cardiac arrest. Plaintiffs' 
expert witness Dr. Edward Banner testified on that issue as 
follows: 
Q. Now, Doctor, in your experience, 
have you ever had a lady in late 
pregnancy -- have you ever known of one 
that you have been taking care of to 
develop this supine hypotension syndrome 
and then have it go on to a cardiac 
arrest? 
A. Never. 
Q. Have you ever heard of a cardiac 
arrest resulting following an 
amniocentesis? 
A. No, sir, I haven't. 
* * * 
Q. Have you in discussing with your 
-14- .... 
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collea~ues ever heard of a cardiac arrest 
resulting from a supine hypotension 
syndrome? 
A. I have not, sir. 
* * * 
Q. H~ve yo~ ever read about in any 
of the medical literature anything about 
a pregnant lady in the late stages of 
pregnancy developing supine hypotension 
syndrome and having that go on to a car-
diac arrest? 
A. No, sir. 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Hanni) Is it fair to 
say then, Doctor, that if you are right 
in what you believe the cause of Mrs. 
Reiser's cardiac arrest is, is it fair to 
say so far as you know either from your 
own experience, from talking to your 
colleagues, from reading the medical 
literature, that this is the first time 
that a cardiac arrest has been caused or 
has followed a supine hypotension 
syndrome? 
A. Yes, that's true. (R. 1412-1414) 
(See also testimony of other expert witnesses, 
R. 1364-1369, 1685-1687, 1812) 
It appears therefore that the causal connection relied 
on by plaintiff has never before occurred in medical history. 
Consequently, it is difficult to see how the defendants can be 
held to the duty to foresee or anticipate this chain of events. 
The evidence is clear that defendants did not expose Mrs. Reiser 
to an unreasonable risk of harm by placing her on her back for an 
amniocentesis procedure at 38 weeks, whether or not that proce-
dure was contraindicated by reason of the earlier test omissions. 
Mrs. Reiser had been on her back on numerous times before for 
other standard office procedures, and would often wake up at 
-1~-
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night finding herself having fallen asleep on her back during her 
pregnancies, and like millions of pregnant women throughout the 
world, she had never suffered from supine hypotensive syndrome or 
a cardiac arrest or any other physical problem. (R. 219) It is, 
therefore, difficult to see how the outcome of the instant case 
could have been "reasonably foreseen" by the defendants. 
Plaintiffs argue that one of the explanations offered by 
an expert witness for defendants as to the cause of the cardi~ 
arrest supports the causal connection between the failure to per-
form the earlier titers and amniocenteses and the injury to the 
infant plaintiff. Defendants' expert witnesses and the 
defendants, themselves, testified that there were various mech~ 
nisms that possibly could have caused the cardiac arrest 
including a reaction to the local anesthetic, (R. 1291, 1676), 
an amniotic fluid embolism, (R. 1677, 1814), and a vaso vagal 
reflex, (R. 1299, 1565, 1684, 1810). 
Physicians at the trial also testified, however, that 
individuals with perfectly normal hearts can suddenly have a car· 
diac arrest for no explained reason. (R. 1067, 813) 
Whatever the cause of the arrest, the evidence also 
demonstrated that the injury to plaintiff was unforeseeable and 
totally unexpected from an amniocentesis. (R. 1291, 1298, 1811, 
1814) 
4. The End Result Would Have Been The Same. 
Defendants contend that the amniocentesis would have 
been performed at or about 38 weeks even if the earlier tests had 
been taken. Consequently the end result would have been the 
same, which is an additional reason why the omissions cannot be a 
-16-
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proximate cause of the injuries. 
Any earlier titer tests would simply have measured the 
level of sensitivity in the mother, but would not measure the 
status of the baby (R. 1311-1333, 1429, 1510-1511). Any earlier 
amniocentesis procedures would simply have assessed the status of 
the infant at the time the test was performed, and the infant's 
condition cannot improve as the pregnancy continues. 
The amniocentesis test result on the 38th week in the 
instant case revealed that the infant was not severely involved 
with the Rh factor. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6; First Transcript of 
Proceedings, p. 647} The infant could very well have stayed in 
the womb for another week or two beyond 38 weeks until conditions 
were more favorable for induction of labor or until spontaneous 
delivery occurred. (First Transcript of Proceedings, p. 120-121, 
576, 717} Consequently, if the baby was not severely enough 
involved to take it out of the uterus environment or to be given 
a blood exchange transfusion at 38 weeks, the same result would 
have been present at 20 or 25 weeks pregnancy, and a further 
amniocentesis would have been necessary around the 38th week. 
Therefore, the earlier tests would not have changed the fact that 
the amniocentesis would have been performed anyway at or about 
the 38th week, and presumably the cardiac arrest would still have 
occurred which led to the brain damage. Plaintiffs do not seem 
to contest this fact, but simply state that this particular 
amniocentesis should not have been performed and that labor 
should have been induced because of the unavailability of data 
from omitted earlier tests. (Plaintiff's Brief, P· 13-14; 
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R. 1073) 
The same kind of situation was encountered in Dickin~ 
v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d 383, 423 P.2d 663 (1967), wherein the infa~ 
plaintiff sustained a severe laceration on his right index fi~H 
and he was treated by defendant. Defendant bandaged the finger 
and four or five days later the bandage was removed by another 
doctor and it was discovered that the finger was black, without 
feeling or sensation, and an amputation of the finger was 
performed. Plaintiff alleged that defendant applied the banda~ 
so tightly that it cut off the circulation and resulted in 
gangrene setting in. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence 
the trial court granted defendant's motion for an involuntary 
dismissal and on appeal the Supreme Court affirmed on the basis 
that the negligent acts complained of did not proximately cause 
the ultimate result of amputation. As support for their holding, 
the court referred to the testimony of plaintiff's own expert 
witness, who testified that in spite of the acts of defendant the 
end result would have been identical and that the hand would have 
been the same "as we now find it". 
In the instant case plaintiffs refer to certain 
omissions that were below the standard of care of a practicing 
physician, but as noted in Dickinson, such errors or omissions 
can only lead to liability and recovery when they are a proximaU 
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. In the instant case, whe~M 
the defendants would have performed the earlier tests or not, the 
end result would have been the same. See also Paull v. Zions 
First National Bank, 18 Utah 2d 183, 117 P.2d 759 (1966); Bonn!! 
v. Conklin, 62 F.2d 875 (D.C.Cir. 1932); and ~W~r~i~g~h~t~v~·__::;C~l~em_e_ll__t, 
-18-
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190 N.E. 11 (Mass. 1934). 
B. Evidence That A Titer Test Was Not Taken And That 
~Amniocentesis Was Not Performed Prior To June 26, 1971, would 
Be Highly And Unfairly Prejudicial Against The Defendants. 
Assuming arguendo that the evidence of the failure to 
perform prior titers and amniocentesis procedures has some rele-
vance or materiality to the issues of this lawsuit, any relevance 
or probative value can only be minimal when weighed against the 
prejudicial effects of such evidence. Because of the slight pro-
bative value and highly prejudicial nature of the evidence, the 
trial court judge excluded the evidence by way of an order in 
limine pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
follows: 
1. Evidence Can Be Excluded Under Rule 45 (U.R.E.) 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as 
Rule 45. Discretion of judge to exclude 
admissible evidence. 
Except as in these rules otherwise 
provided, the judge may in his discretion 
exclude evidence if he finds that its 
probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the risk that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of 
time, or (b) create substantial danger of 
undue prejudice or of confusing the 
issues or of misleading the jury, or (c) 
unfairly and harmfully surprise a party 
who has not had reasonable opportunity to 
anticipate that such evidence would be 
offered. 
The Rule clearly states that the decision of whether to 
exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and the supreme court of the state of Utah has recognized 
time and again that the trial court should be accorded a large 
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measure of discretion in this regard and should be reversed only 
when there is a clear abuse of that discretion, Martin v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977), State v. 
Minnish, 560 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977). 
Plaintiffs repeatedly argue that the failure of the 
defendants to take titer tests and to perform amniocentesis pro· 
cedures prior to June 26, 1971, was not in conformity with the 
recognized standard of care in the treatment of the Rh factor ~ 
pregnant women. Assuming that such omissions were negligence, 
the probative value of the defendants' neglect in that instance 
is non-existent. However, if the jury is allowed to hear evi-
dence of one area of neglect in treating the plaintiff's mother, 
Eleanor Reiser, it would be highly prejudicial to the defendants, 
At the time that Judge Sawaya considered defendants' 
Motion in Limine prior to the second trial of this case, he had 
before him the transcript of proceedings in the original trial 
held in November of 1977. Even a cursory examination of the 
transcript of proceedings in that first trial illustrated how 
often plaintiffs' counsel attempted to get before the jury the 
evidence of the failure to perform the earlier tests in spite cl 
the court's ruling at the beginning of the trial that such evi· 
dence was to be excluded. As part of the Memorandum in support 
of defendants' Motion in Limine, defendants cited for Judge 
Sawaya several parts of the original transcript of proceedings 
illustrating the various ways plaintiffs' counsel attempted to 
present these omissions to the jury. The Memorandum submitted to 
the court containing the quoted passages from the transcript ue 
-20-
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part of this record on appeal. (R. 313-316) 
Based on what happened at the first trial, defendants' 
counsel filed a Motion in Limine weeks in advance of the second 
trial and obtained an Order in Limine in writing requiring 
plaintiffs' counsel to refrain from bringing up the issue. 
In spite of the ruling in limine, plaintiffs were able 
to present all relevant evidence as to the theories of negligence 
that allegedly brought about the injuries to the infant 
plaintiff. 
However, Judge Sawaya held firm on his decision not to 
allow the evidence of the failure to perform the earlier titer 
and amniocentesis procedures. At one point in the trial, the 
court made it clear as to the basis for his ruling: 
THE COURT: I've already made a 
ruling in this matter and there is no 
point in debating it every time we come 
into Court or call a witness. It seems to 
me it's clear in my mind and I appreciate 
that we each have a different opinion 
about what this case is all about but I 
have already made a ruling on the issue 
and that is that evidence of the failure 
to take a prior titer and a prior 
amniocentesis is not proper evidence 
because of causation and I agree with 
defense counsel that letting it in would 
create a greater risk that this Jury 
would return a verdict on the basis of 
that act of negligence than the one that 
actually caused the injury. 
Now, it seems to me that this 
constant haranguing about it and constant 
argument about it isn't going to make it 
any different than it was back at the 
beginning. 
Plaintiffs correctly point out in their Brief that there 
is a distinct similarity between Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. A review 
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of federal cases interpreting Rule 403 illustrates the numerous 
instances when highly prejudicial evidence was excluded from the 
jury. Yellow Bayou Plantation, Inc. v. Shell Chemical Inc 4 - - I ' I 91 
F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1974), Kilarjian v. Horvath, 379 F.2d 547 
(2nd Cir. 1967); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th 
Cir. 1978); Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., American Home Produ~, 
594 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1979). 
2. A Motion In Limine Was The Proper Way To Exclude The 
Evidence Because Of The Highly Prejudicial Effect. 
The value of a motion in limine to exclude prejudicial 
evidence prior to trial is seen in the case of Troxel v. Otto, 
287 N.E. 2d 791 (Ind. 1972). The plaintiff had brought an actioo 
against the husband of the deceased defendant for injuries 
arising out of an automobile accident. The defendant died from 
injuries suffered in a subsequent unrelated accident. At the 
trial plaintiff's attorney mentioned the subsequent automobile 
accident on several occasions to the jury as "one more instance . 
• • of her (defendant) not looking." The appellate court 
referred to the remarks of counsel as matters that he sought ~ 
be thrust into the lawsuit that were prejudicial. In its 
opinion, the court noted how the defendant's attorney could have 
prevented these remarks of counsel by a motion before trial: 
Alert counsel, however, may protect him-
self against possible misconduct by means 
of a pre-trial order determining admissi-
bility whenever his trial preparations 
discloses evidence of a highly prejudi-
cial nature which may or may not be 
admissible. Protective orders might con-
versely serve as a firm and advance admo-
nition to counsel not to embark upon a 
path which might lead to a mistrial or 
-22-
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re~e7sa1 7 Such pre-trial preparation and 
ut1l1zat1on of the available procedures 
is to be encouraged. 287 N.E.2d at 794. 
The number of times that plaintiffs' counsel in the 
instant case at the first trial asked questions of witnesses con-
cerning the failure to perform the earlier tests and the constant 
objections and requests to approach the bench by defense counsel 
clearly illustrates the need for an order in limine rather than 
to attempt to cure the problem as the questions were asked. 
Judge Sawaya could see the danger in attempting to exclude this 
kind of evidence as the questions are asked and the relative 
ineffectiveness of asking the jury to disregard the questions 
each time they are asked. In 63 A.L.R.3d 311, 313, the author 
states: 
It is commonly understood by trial 
lawyers that prejudice implanted or sti-
mulated in the minds of jurors can win 
trials, but objecting to the prejudicial 
material may only emphasize it, and that 
traditional 'curative' actions taken by 
trial judges when prejudicial material is 
objected to are ineffective and 
unrealistic and may aggravate the poten-
tial harm. 
A motion in limine in the instant case was therefore a 
proper procedure to exclude the irrelevant or minimally probative 
evidence of a failure to perform earlier titers and amniocentesis 
procedures, when such evidence would be highly and unfairly pre-
judicial against the defendants. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
SUBMITTING A SPECIAL VERDICT TO THE JURY 
AND THE VERDICT FORM SUBMITTED DID 
ADEQUATELY ALLOW THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE 
PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF THE CASE. 
As noted in plaintiff's brief, the trial court submitted 
a special verdict form to the jury, requiring the jury to answu 
special interrogatories, rather than having the jury respond to a 
general verdict. The special verdict form asked the following 
five questions: (1) Was defendant, Richard Lehner, negligent h 
allowing Mrs. Reiser to lie on her back for an excessive peri~ 
of time? (2) If your answer to no. 1 is yes, was such negli-
gence a proximate cause of the injury or damage to the plaintiffl 
(3) Was the defendant Richard Lehner negligent in the acts and 
efforts utilized or not utilized to resuscitate Mrs. Reiser 
during the time she was unconscious? (4) If your answer to no. 
3 is yes, was such negligence a proximate cause of the injury or 
damage to the plaintiff? (5) If your answers to questions 1 and 
2 are yes or to questions 3 and 4 are yes or the answer to all cl 
the above questions are yes, then you are to answer the following 
question: What are the plaintiff's damages? 
The jury returned a verdict to the court answering 
questions 1 and 3 "no", and having answered in that manner the 
other questions were not to be answered by the jury. 
Rule 49(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
the trial court the option to have the jury complete a "specitl 
verdict". The rule states in part: 
The court may require a jury to return 
only a special verdict in the form of a 
special written finding upon each issue 
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o~ fact. In that event the court may sub-
m1 t to the jury written interrogatories 
susceptible of categorical or other brief 
answer or may submit writtern forms of 
the several special findings which might 
properly be made under the pleadings and 
evidence; or it may use such other method 
of submitting the issues and requiring 
the written findings thereon as it deems 
most appropriate. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the 
decision of whether to submit the case on a "special verdict" is 
one for the sound discretion of the trial court, Cooper v. Evans, 
l Utah 2d 68, 262 P.2d 278 (1953); Milligan v. Capitol Furniture, 
8 Utah 2d 383, 335 P.2d 619 (1959); Page v. Utah Home Fire Insurance 
Company, 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290 (1964); and Ewell & Son, 
Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 
(1972). Further, in Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 
564 (1960), this court held that: "It is elementary that there 
is no impropriety in submitting special interrogatories if the 
court so desires." 
In plaintiff's brief the case of Barton v. Jensen, 19 
Utah 2d 196, 429 P.2d 44 (1967), is cited as authority for the 
concept that a special verdict form which eliminates certain 
theories of plaintiff's case or severely restricts the issues 
upon which the jury can make a finding would constitute a clear 
abuse of discretion on the trial court. However, Barton stands 
merely for the concept that the court went beyond what is ordi-
narily considered as "polling the jury" and that as a result of 
the questioning in open court by the judge, some of the jury mem-
bers may have changed their opinion as to the merits of the 
cause. 
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As grounds for their statement that the submission of a 
special verdict was error, plaintiffs argue that several theories 
of negligence were not allowed to be considered by the jury. 
An understanding of plaintiffs' overall theories of negligence 
and causation, however, which were presented to the jury by 
questions 1 through 4 of the verdict form, reveals that every one 
of the claimed allegations of negligence which plaintiff 
indicates were not submitted to the jury, were in fact presented 
and encompassed within the verdict form. For example, the alle-
gation of the failure of the doctor and nurses to properly attend 
to Mrs. Reiser, the allegation of the failure to monitor 
Mrs. Resier, and the allegation of the failure on the part of the 
doctor to adequately train his nursing staff to recognize the 
symptoms of supine hypotensive syndrome, are all encompassed in 
the question of whether Dr. Lobner was negligent in allowing 
Mrs. Reiser to lie on her back for an excessive period of time. 
Each of the stated allegations of negligence referred to by 
plaintiffs suggest that if the doctor was at all times doing what 
he should have done, Mrs. Reiser would not have been allowed to 
lie on her back for an excessive period of time. 
Further, the allegations of failing to have oxygen ~r 
sent and failing to have the nurses participate in the resuscita· 
tive efforts are each incorporated in the general question of, 
"Was the defendant Richard Lobner negligent in the acts and 
efforts utilized or not utilized to resuscitate Mrs. Reiser 
during the time she was unconscious?" The implication of not 
having oxygen present and not having the nurses participate in 
the resuscitative efforts simply goes to the question of whether 
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the acts and efforts utilized by Dr. Lehner were what they should 
have been given the standard of care. 
Plaintiffs further argue in their brief that they were 
precluded from presenting the issue that defendants were negli-
gent in "failing to induce labor when they obtained the initial. 
titer of 1:128." Plaintiffs fail to point out, however, that 
plaintiffs' counsel agreed and indicated to the court that the 
issue of failing to induce labor rather than perform an amniocen-
tesis at 38 weeks should not go to the jury. 
In the very beginning of the trial plaintiffs' counsel 
stated that in light of the court's order in limine plaintiffs 
would not present the issue of the failure to induce labor. In 
fact, plaintiffs' counsel specifically told the court that he was 
not going to argue that doing the amniocentesis at 38 weeks 
rather than inducing labor was a negligent act: 
THE COURT: But are you going to argue 
that doing it at thirty-eight weeks was a 
negligent act? 
MR. HOWARD: No. I'm going to argue 
having her on her back at thirty-eight 
weeks for any operation, any procedure 
was negligence. 
THE COURT: If you are not going to claim 
that doing it at that period of her 
pregnancy was an act of negligence then I 
don't see any point of raising it. 
MR. HOWARD: Not the amniocentesis. Any 
procedure. If he had had her on her back 
to take her temperature and had her there 
for eight minutes, it would have b7en 
negligence. This is under the ruling of 
this Court. (R. 1094) 
In spite of the above representation, plaintiffs' coun-
sel in opening statement and through testimony of expert wit-
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.., 
nesses did refer to the failure to induce labor rather than Per. 
form an amniocentesis as negligence. The court later in the 
trial inquired of plaintiffs' counsel whether there was an iss~ 
that the doing of the amniocentesis in this particular case was 
negligence, and after plaintiffs' counsel reported that was n~ 
an issue, the court removed it from the jury. Part of the 
dialogue between the court and counsel in that regard is as 
follows: 
THE COURT: The question is whether or 
not it was negligent to have her on her 
back --
MR. HOWARD: That's right. 
THE COURT: (continuing) -- for an 
extended period of time. 
I'll submit that as a special interroga-
tory but I will not submit as a special 
interrogatory the question of whether or 
not it was negligent to perform an 
amniocentesis at thirty-eight weeks. 
MR. HOWARD: I'll agree. That's per-
fectly all right. (R. 1487-1488) 
In light of the representations of plaintiffs' counsel, 
it would appear that plaintiffs waived any right to have this 
issue presented to the jury, in effect agreeing that the givi~ 
of an amniocentesis rather than inducing labor at 38 weeks was 
not part of plaintiffs' theory of the case, which simply related 
to whether the defendants had left the patient on her back fm u 
excessive period of time, for whatever reason. The reason she 
was on her back was not related to the injury as has been 
thoroughly discussed earlier. 
From all of the foregoing it appears that the special 
verdict form submitted adequately covered the theories of negli· Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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gence that the plaintiff presented and the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in failing to submit a general verdict form. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
FAILING TO GIVE TO THE JURY THE ISSUE OF 
INFORMED CONSENT. 
Plaintiffs argue in their brief that nbecause of the 
ruling of the court on the motion in limine, plaintiffs were 
precluded from having their medical experts testify that the 
doctor's alleged mismanagement and failure to take timely tests 
would be an essential part of any informed consent." Plaintiffs 
further state that because of the motion in limine the court was 
forced to reject plaintiffs' requested instruction on informed 
consent, "even though the court recognized that there was an 
issue on informed consent." (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 37) 
The truth of the matter is that the court never 
recognized that there was an issue on informed consent with or 
without the order in limine. The record clearly reveals this: 
THE COURT: I can't see this problem, I'm 
sorry, no matter how you argue it. 
Informed consent. Okay. She should have 
been told there was risk involved in the 
procedure she underwent on June 26th. 
Beyond that, why would she have to be 
told they were doing it because they 
didn't do it on prior occasions? That 
doesn't make any sense to me at all. 
Informed consent simply means that she 
has to know all the risks involved in the 
procedure she is about to undertake. 
Now, having failed to do prior procedures 
has nothing to do with whether or not she 
is informed of what's going to happen 
with this procedure. 
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A. Defendant's Duty To Obtain An Informed Consent 
Extends Only To Informing The Patient Of Substantial, And 
Significant, Risks. 
In plaintiffs' jury instruction requesting the issue of 
"informed consent", plaintiffs recognize that the defendants must 
inform the patient of the "risks involved in the procedure 
performed". (R. 192) (Emphasis added) 
This duty is further defined by the recent Utah sta~b 
which, although not applicable directly because the statute was 
not in effect in 1971, is still very instructive on the kind of 
information that is considered necessary to disclose to a 
patient. O.C.A. §78-14-5, as it became effective in 1976, 
requires that the physician need only inform the patient of the 
"substantial" and •significant" risks of the procedure to be 
performed. 
The procedure performed in the instant case was an 
amniocentesis which carried certain minor risks, including 
sticking the baby with a needle and infection. 
Plaintiffs cannot and do not contend that the failure to 
perform prior amniocentesis procedures or prior titer tests were 
in any way a risk associated with the performance of the 
amniocentesis at 38 weeks. Plaintiffs' only argument for 
claiming error on the issue of informed consent is that the 
omission of the earlier tests was information that should have 
been supplied to the patient, Mrs. Reiser, in deciding whether to 
have the amniocentesis performed at the 38th week. This does not 
appear to be the kind of information that is necessary to obtain 
an informed consent under Utah law. See also Ficklin v. 
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Macfarlane, 550 P.2d 1295 (Utah 1976). 
The injury received by the infant plaintiff in the 
instant case was a result of "anoxia", which is the condition 
caused by the cardiac arrest suffered by Mrs. Reiser after the 
amniocentesis procedure was performed. Plaintiffs cannot and do 
not contend that the possibility of obtaining a cardiac arrest 
from the amniocentesis procedure was a risk that should have been 
explained to her. All of the evidence at the trial confirmed the 
fact that a cardiac arrest has never resulted from an amniocen-
tesis procedure before and that a cardiac arrest has never 
resulted from the condition known as supine hypotensive syndrome, 
which plaintiffs claim brought about the cardiac arrest. 
(R. 1364-1369, 1412-1414, 1685-1687, 1812) 
Dr. Lehner testified that he did inform Mrs. Reiser of 
the major risks associated with the giving of the amniocentesis, 
including striking the baby with the needle and infection. (R. 1518) 
B. Any Failure To Inform Mrs. Reiser Of The Omission Of 
The Earlier Tests Or Of The Risks Of Performing An Amniocentesis 
Cannot Be A Proximate Cause Of Plaintiff's Injuries. 
Any failure to inform Mrs. Reiser of test omissions can-
not be a proximate cause of the injuries to the Reiser baby. The 
infant was not injured as a result of the Rh factor or a break-
down of the infant's blood from the attack of the mother's 
antibodies. This has been thoroughly discussed in Point I of 
this brief. 
It is a well-settled principle that the physician's 
failure to adequately inform must be a proximate cause of the 
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damage to the patient in order to hold defendants liable. 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790; Wales v. Barnes, 261 
So. 2d 201 (Fla.App. 1972); Vara v. Drago, 264 N. Y. s. 2d 660 (N.Y, 
1965), U.C.A. §78-14-5(1) (g), and plaintiffs' requested jury 
instructions (R. 192). 
It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs cite the 
case of Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979), as a case 
where the doctrine of informed consent has been recently "well 
stated". Gates is clearly distinguishable, however, from the 
instant case on the issue of causation, in that the problem deve· 
loping from the lack of information given to the patient was 
directly related to the actual injury ultimately received. In 
the instant case, however, and as has been noted again and again, 
the infant plaintiff's injuri~s had nothing to do with the Rh 
factor and a failure to perform the earlier tests and acquaint 
Mrs. Reiser with that failure was simply not a cause of the 
injuries. 
The causal relationship is also missing in any claim 
that Dr. Lobner did not inform Mrs. Reiser of the usual and 
expected risks of an amniocentesis. The baby was not injured as 
a result of a needle striking it or from infection introduced 
into the amniotic cavity. There is no contention by plaintiffs 
that there are any other usual and expected risks of an 
amniocentesis. 
C. Husband Consent Not Required For The Performance..21 
An Amniocentesis. 
Plaintiffs argue that the infant plaintiff's father, 
Richard Reiser, should have been consulted concerning the 
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amniocentesis procedure. Plaintiffs have incorrectly cited Hope 
v. Nielsen, 523 P.2d 211 (Wash. 1974), as authority for the pro-
position that a physician must have an informed consent from both 
parents for a procedure affecting an unborn fetus. (Plaintiff• s 
brief, p. 40) In that case, the court simply required an 
informed consent from the "parents" concerning a cesarean 
section, but did not discuss the right of the "father" and the 
"mother" both to give such an informed consent. 
The Utah informed consent statute addresses this subject 
more directly and specifies the individual who has the right to 
give the "informed consent" in a situation involving a pregnancy: 
(4) The following persons are authorized 
and empowered to consent to any health 
care not prohibited by law: 
* * * (f) Any female regardless of her age 
or marital status, when given in connec-
tion with her pregnancy or childbirth. 
U.C.A. §78-14-5 (4) (f). 
A case directly on point from the Second District Court 
of Appeals in California is Rosenburg v. Feigin, 260 P.2d 143 
(Cal.App. 1953), wherein the plaintiff was a husband of a patient 
treated by defendant during the course of her pregnancy, and 
plaintiff contended that he did not give consent to the 
defendant's treatment, which amounted to malpractice, and 
resulted in a miscarriage. In affirming the judgment of 
dismissal against the husband, the court stated: 
brr 
The defendant as physician for the wife 
of plaintiff had a right and duty to give 
her the care and treatment that she 
required and consented to, according to 
accepted standards of his profession, and 
is not liable to the husband because he 
did not notify the husband of the nature 
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and possible effect of the care which he 
contemplated and regarded as necessary, 
and did not secure the huband's consent. 
260 P.2d at 144. 
See also Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1970). 
Based on all the foregoing, it appears clear that the 
trial court did not err in failing to present the issue of 
informed consent to the jury. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION BY REASON OF THE EXPIRATION OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
On January 23, 1976, Judge Allen B. Sorensen granted a 
summary judgment against plaintiff Eleanor Reiser upon the first 
cause. of action of plaintiffs' complaint. (R. 762-763) The 
Minute Entry and Ruling of January 16, 1976, of Judge Sorensen 
indicates that the first cause of action was barred by reason of 
the expiration of the statute of limitations, 78-12-28(3), 
U.C.A., (1953). 
A. A Separate Trial On The Applicability Of The Statut1 
Of Limitations Is Not Required When There Is No Dispute Of The 
Applicable Facts. 
Plaintiffs argue that Utah Code Annotated §78-12-47 (~ 
effect at the time) is a party's right to have the statute of 
limitations issue in a medical malpractice case tried by a jury. 
Plaintiffs' argument, in effect, would deny a trial court from 
granting a summary judgment on the basis of the expiration of thi 
medical malpractice statute of limitations. The statute cit~. 
however, does not extend to the limits implied by plaintiffs' 
argument. · e1 Section 78-12-47 states merely that, "the issue rais 
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thereby may be tried separately before any other issues in the 
case are tried." (Emphasis added) It does not state that the 
limitations issue must be tried in a separate action and the sta-
tute on its face does not take from the trial court the preroga-
tive to dismiss a claim on the basis that there are no material 
issues of fact concerning the expiration of the statute of 
limitations. 
The authority of a trial court to grant a summary 
judgment when there is no substantial issue of fact involved on 
the issue of the statute of limitations is well settled. 51 
Am.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, 927 §470, 61 A.L.R.2d 341, 342. 
Judge Sorensen correctly determined that there was no 
triable issue of fact as to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations by virtue of the extensive deposition testimony cited 
in defendants' memorandum in support of the motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 822-827) 
B. Plaintiff Eleanor Reiser Filed Her Lawsuit Two Years 
After The Date That She Discovered Her Injury Or Through The Use 
Of Reasonable Diligence Should Have Discovered Her Injury And Her 
Cause Of Action was Therefore Barred Under The Provisions Of 
U.C.A. §78-12-28 (3). 
The applicable statute of limitations for medical 
malpractice actions in effect at the time plaintiffs filed this 
matter was u.c.A. §78-12-28(3) which stated that an action 
against a physician must be filed "two years after the date of 
injury or two years after the plaintiff discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury, 
whichever occurs later. • . . " 
---
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Since plaintiffs filed their lawsuit on May 1, 1974, thi 
foregoing statute would require that plaintiff Eleanor Reiser 
must have discovered her injury after May 1, 1972, in order for 
the cause of action to be valid. 
Numerous testimony from the depositions of plaintiff 
Eleanor Reiser and plaintiff Richard Reiser, as well as physiciai 
treating Mrs. Reiser, is cited in the memorandum in support of 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. 823-827) All of 
this testimony clearly revealed that Mrs. Reiser experienced 
memory, balance, and visual problems almost immediately after th1 
cardiac arrest which she experienced on June 26, 1971. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently announced the 
opinion of Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (1979), wherein the 
court held that the statute of limitations for medical malprac-
tice claims begins to run, "when an injured person knows or 
should know that he has suffered a legal injury." 601 P.2d at 
147. 
There are several distinguishing features between the 
instant case and Foil, which would suggest a different result 
from that obtained in the Foil decision. In Foil, the plaintiff 
originally sustained a back injury in May of 1967. She was 
treated with good results and was gainfully employed until 
December, 1971, when she again injured her back. A surgeon then 
performed additional surgery. Because of continued back pain, 
plaintiff was given injections of caudal anesthesia as well as 
various medications and subcutaneous electrical stimulation, froi 
November 30th to December 15, 1973. She was then later read-
mitted to the hospital on January 18, 1974, and received a 
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"subarachnoid phenol block." 
Plaintiff next suffered from a rectal and bladder 
disorder resulting in major surgery in December, 1975. Her 
health problems persisted, and she eventually received a report 
from the Workmen's Compensation Medical Panel indicating that the 
rectal and bladder problems resulted from the causative agents 
of the "block" administered in January of 1974. It was at that 
point that the court held plaintiff Foil had discovered her 
"legal injury." 
In Foil, one can plainly see that it would have been 
difficult for plaintiff to have established any causal rela-
tionship between the treatment of the defendant physician who 
administered the "block" and the rectal and bladder disorder. 
This subsequent problem could have been totally unrelated to any 
medical treatment received, and by the time defendant had treated 
plaintiff, she had already received so much medical attention 
that it would have been difficult to isolate any specific act 
that could have been negligence. 
In the instant case, however, there is no question but 
that plaintiff Eleanor Reiser experienced loss of memory, balance 
and visual problems that she was told was a direct result of the 
cardiac arrest. (R. 823-827) Consequently, if plaintiff had a 
claim for malpractice that was incident to the cardiac arrest, 
the only medical treatment to suspect would be that given by Dr. 
Lehner on June 26, 1971. with that in mind, it is incumbent upon 
Plaintiff to exercise the reasonable diligence to discover 
whether there may have been any negligence. Plaintiff cannot sit 
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by and wait until someone tells them there may be malpractice 
before the time commences for the applicable statute of 
limitations. This relationship of the responsibility of the 
plaintiff to make reasonable inquiry with the running of the 
discovery statute of limitations in a medical malpractice acti~ 
is required by many courts throughout the country. In Mock v. 
Santa Monica Hospital, 9 Cal. Reptr. 555 (1960), the court 
affirmed a summary dismissal of plaintiff's case stating: 
This brings into play the rule so fre-
quently announced in this state that as 
the means of knowledge are equivalent to 
knowledge, if it appears that the plain-
tiff had notice or information of cir-
cumstances which would put him on an 
inquiry which, if followed, would lead to 
knowledge, or that the facts were pre-
sumptively within his knowledge, he will 
be deemed to have had actual knowledge of 
these facts. 9 Cal. Reptr. at 561-62. 
See also Hemingway v. Waxler, 274 P.2d 699 (Cal. 1954). 
Defendants contend that this standard should apply to 
malpractice actions of the kind involved in this case and that 
based on the amount of knowledge that Mrs. Reiser had of her 
"injury" that the trial court summary judgment should be 
affirmed. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' THIRD CAUSE OF 
ACTION BECAUSE THE CLAIM FOR EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM UPON 
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
Plaintiff's third cause of action of their complaint 
alleged "emotional damage" by reason of the injuries to their 
daughter. (R. 930) The trial court dismissed this cause of 
action by summary judgment for the reason that such a cause of 
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action is not recognized in Utah. In so ruling, the trial court 
correctly held that Utah has not extended recovery for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. 
In Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916), 
and Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), both of 
which were cases involving "intentional" infliction of emotional 
distress, the Supreme court specifically stated that emotional 
damages could not be recovered for mere negligence. In Samms, 
the court stated: 
Our study of the authorities, and of the 
arguments advanced, convinces us, that 
conceding such a cause of action, may not 
be based upon mere negligence, the best 
considered view recognizes an action for 
severe emotional distress, though not 
accompanied by bodily impact or physical 
injury, where the defendant intentionally 
engaged in some conduct toward the 
plaintiff. • • • (Emphasis added) 
358 P.2d at 346-47. 
In Preece v. Baur, 143 F.Supp. 804 (E.D. Idaho 1956), 
the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Idaho applied 
Utah law in holding that a parent could not recover for mental 
distress or anxiety when his child had been put in peril by the 
negligence of a third party. 
This is the general rule that is supported throughout 
the country, as is articulated in 32 A.L.R.2d 1078, §7: 
The rule has been recognized in a number 
of later cases that there can be no 
recovery by a parent in an action for 
injuries to a minor child, for the pain, 
suffering, or other distress caused the 
parent by the injuries of the child. 
The exception to this general rule that has been adopted 
in some jurisdictions would permit recovery for emotional 
-39-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
distress when such distress results in physical injury to the 
plaintiff and where the plaintiff is either within the "zone ~ 
danger" or where there has been contemporaneous observance of a 
sudden and immediate injury to a close member of the plaintiff's 
family. Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Reptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968), 
77 A.L.R.3d 447. 
The landmark decision of Dillon v. Legg, supra, from the 
California Supreme Court clearly did not extend recovery for emo· 
tional distress to parents in situations like the instant case 
where the injury to the child was not a result of a "single 
traumatic incident", and where the emotional distress to the 
parents caused by the injury to the child did not result in 
actual physical injury to the parents. In the later California 
decision of Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 98 Cal. 
Reptr. 631 (1971), aff'd 103 Cal. Reptr. 856, 500 P.2d 880 
(1972), the parents were attempting to recover for emotional 
distress caused as a result of a salmonella bacteria infection 
transferred to their infant daughter as a result of negligence~ 
the hospital where the infant was born. Symptoms of the 
daughter's disease lasted off and on over a period of 9 to 12 
months. In rejecting any recovery for emotional distress, the 
Appellate Court stated: 
We believe Dillon does not apply to the 
circumstances of the case at bench. 
Dillon involved a single traumatic 
accident, observable and contem-
poraneously observed. Here the 
'accident' was the unobservable 
transmission of an infection, and the 
shock came only from viewing the lengthy 
unfolding of the symptoms of the 
infection. Moreover, Dillon was limited Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to a case in which the shock resulted in 
physical injury. 98 Cal.Rptr. at 635. 
(The California Supreme Court in this same case affirmed the fact 
that Dillon did not extend to mental distress that does not 
result in physical injury, 500 P.2d 800, 882, footnote 1.) 
In the recent case of Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668 
(Ariz. 1979), the Arizona Supreme Court held that evidence of 
physical injury would be required resulting from emotional 
distress in order to provide recovery to the parents. The court 
reasoned as follows: 
In order for there to be recovery for the 
tort of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, the shock or mental anguish of 
the plaintiff must be manifested as a 
physical injury. Damages for emotional 
disturbance alone are too speculative. 
593 P.2d at 669-670. 
For other recent cases requiring the allegations of actual physi-
cal injury resulting from claims of emotional distress, see 
Aragon v. Spellman, 491 P.2d 173 (N.M. 1971); Archibald v. 
Braverman, 79 Cal.Rptr. 723 (Cal.App. 1969); and Owens v. 
Children's Memorial Hospital, 480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973). 
The facts of the instant case clearly do not support 
recovery for emotional distress to the plaintiff parents as a 
result of the alleged negligent infliction of injuries upon their 
infant daughter. Although plaintiffs cite two lower court 
opinions from other jurisdictions as support for this claim, the 
overwhelming majority of cases throughout the country would not 
provide recovery. The third cause of action in the complaint 
clearly shows that plaintiff, Mr. Reiser, has not suffered any 
physical injuries whatsoever, and the physical injuries incurred 
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by Mrs. Reiser are not alleged to have been caused by the actual 
emotional distress that she incurred as a result of the injuriu 
to her child. Further, the injuries to the infant daughter did 
not involve a single traumatic observable accident. 
POINT VI. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO POINTS IV AND V, 
PLAINTIFFS RICHARD AND ELEANOR REISER'S 
CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
Even if the parents' claims in the instant case are n~ 
barred by reason of the expiration of the statute of limitations 
or by reason of a failure to properly state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, the parents are "collaterally estopped" 
from pursuing their claims against the defendants. The doctrine 
of collateral estoppel, which is either a part of or a cousin 
to the doctrine of res judicata, is said to reflect the refus~ 
of the law, "to tolerate a multiplicity of, or needless, 
litigation•. 46 Am.Jur. 2d, Judgments, 561 §395. While certain 
aspects of the res judicata doctrine have the effect of 
precluding a plaintiff from reli tigating the same cause of action 
against the same defendant, the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue ~~ 
has been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a 
prior matter which was based on a different cause of action. 
46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, 563-567, §396-398; Restatement of the 
Law, Judgments, §45, comment (c); In re West Jordan, Inc., 7 Utan 
2d 391, 326 P.2d 105 (Utah 1958). 
-42-
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A. All Issues Have Been Litigated and Resolved in 
Favor of Defendants. 
The general rule is that the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel only applies when a question of fact essential to and 
determinative of the judgment is actually litigated and deter-
mined by a valid or final judgment which is conclusive as between 
the parties to a subsequent action on a different cause of 
action. In re West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d at 394, 46 Am.Jur.2d, 
Judgments, 591 §422. 
There should be no dispute in the instant case that the 
issues of liability against defendants that would be raised in a 
new trial by the plaintiff parents, would simply be a relitiga-
tion of the same issues already tried. If the plaintiff Eleanor 
Reiser has a claim for personal injuries, it is based on the same 
theory as the claim for personal injuries on the part of the 
infant plaintiff, Elizabeth. Furthermore, the claim for emo-
tional distress on the part of the father, Richard Reiser, is 
somewhat derivative in nature and could not be based on any issue 
of liability against the defendants that has not already been 
fully litigated in the prior action. 
B. The Plaintiff Parents Are in Privity With the 
Infant Plaintiff. 
It is well settled that the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel or the doctrine of res judicata binds only those who 
were parties to the original proceedings or those who were in 
"privity" with the parties to the original proceedings. ~ 
Allen Mining co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 P. 
231 (1931); Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 {Utah 1978) • 
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The United States Supreme Court in Chicago R.I.&P. ~ 
Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 70 L.Ed. 757 (1926), characterizec 
the necessary relationship for res judicata and collateral es~~ 
pel purposes as "substantial identity", rather than privity, be· 
tween the parties. Under the Schendel doctrine, the true testh 
whether the person whose interest is represented in the two suits 
is the same. The substantial interest test described in the 
Schendel case appears to be somewhat the same as the definition 
that the Utah Supreme Court gave to the concept of privity in 
Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., supra. 
This identity of interest has been found to be present 
in several cases involving separate actions brought by husband 
and wife or separate actions brought by parent and child. In 
Wilkey v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 322 P.2d 1058 
(Okla. 1957), three separate lawsuits were filed against defe~ 
dant based on injuries and death occurring incident to a 
bus/truck accident. The driver of the truck filed two wrongf~ 
death actions on behalf of his wife and daughter, and a separate 
action for his own injuries and for property damage to his 
vehicle. The wrongful death action on behalf of his wife was 
brought to trial first and a verdict was rendered in favor of 
defendant. The defendant then sought to have the first 
judgment rendered conclusive as to the other two lawsuits fil~ 
and the lower court granted defendant's motion. The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, holding that plaintiffs 
were "collaterally es topped" from litigating the same issues of 
liability against the defendant. 
-44-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Further in Laws v. Fisher, 513 P.2d 876 (Okla. 1973), 
the court applied collateral estoppel to a husband's action 
brought after the wife of plaintiff had previously brought an 
action against the same defendant, and a judgment had been granted 
for defendants, for damages arising from injuries to her in an 
automobile accident. The husband, as driver of the vehicle, was 
asserting the claim for loss of the wife's services, society and 
companionship, consortium and other damages to himself, and also 
for damages to and loss of use of his automobile. In granting 
defendant's motion for a judgment as a matter of law in favor of 
defendant, the court held that the husband and wife were "in 
privity" and there appeared to be no "adversity of interest" 
between the two. 513 A.2d at 878. 
In the instant case any further litigation on the part 
of the parents against defendants would in fact be a litigation 
of the same issues by parties who are in "privity" with the 
plaintiff in the earlier action determined in favor of 
defendants. There should be little doubt that the interests of 
the parents are substantially identical to those of the infant 
plaintiff in pursuing their claims. 
c. The Plaintiff Parents Controlled and Participated 
Fully in the Litigation. 
One generally recognized exception to the requirement 
that the parties be tne same or in privity is found in the 
situation where an individual who is not a party to the litiga-
tion participates in the case to such a degree that the policies 
underlying the privity requirement are not applicable and res 
judicata or collateral estoppel will be applied to any subsequent 
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action. In the instant case, the parents should be collater~~ 
estopped because they participated fully in the litigation wi~ 
their daughter as plaintiff and in fact controlled the litigat~ 
to such a degree that the parents cannot claim a denial of due 
process or that they did not have their "day in court". 
The leading case applying this general exception 
referred to is Souffront v. Campagine Des Sucreries, 217 u.s. 
475, 54 L. Ed. 846 (1910), and it has been very recently applied 
by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Montana v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 99 s. Ct. 970, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 
(February 22, 1979). 
In Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378 F. 2d 876 (5th 
Cir. 1967), the defendants had cleared some of their land and in 
the process allegedly desecrated a cemetery as well. A suit was 
brought by one individual claiming damages as a result of the 
desecration of the cemetery, a trial was held, and the jury fu~ 
that the desecration had not occurred. A later suit was brought 
by different plaintiffs and the trial court held as a matter of 
law that an estoppel would work to defeat the second lawsuit. 
The circuit court affirmed applying the general rule of non-part~ 
participation in the litigation. 
In a Law Review note that analyzed Cauefield and other 
similar cases, the author discusses the merits of the Cauefie~ 
opinion: 
In Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., for 
example, the interest of the litigant in 
not being estopped on the basis of a 
prior action to which he was not a party 
is hardly compelling. The plaintiff's 
claim of cemetery desecration was iden-
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tical to the claim litigated in the prior 
action, his attorney was also the attor-
ney in that action. The plaintiff not 
only knew of the prior action at the time 
it took place, but even testified, as did 
all the other potential plaintiffs. 
Moreover, the plaintiff conceded that he 
could produce no new evidence, and the 
simplicity of the factual questions and 
governing legal propositions made it 
unlikely that a different strategy or set 
of arguments, if pursued, would make much 
difference. In light of these factors, 
the plaintiff's interest in Cauefield in 
being free to relitigate the issue of 
liability is not of paramount 
importance. 87 Harvard L. Rev., 
"Collateral Estoppel of Non-parties", 
p. 1485. 
As in Cauefield, the plaintiff parents in the instant 
case were actually in control of the litigation. The attorney 
hired to represent the parents was the same attorney that repre-
sented the interests of the infant plaintiff. Further, the 
parents testified at both trials and were in attendance during 
most of the trials wherein it was ultimately determined that 
defendants were not liable, and it is difficult to see how the 
parents could produce any further evidence that was not already 
presented. 
The participating non-party rule has been recognized 
widely throughout the country and should apply as a matter of 
public policy to a case of this nature. Restatement of 
Judgments, §84; 50 c.J.S., Judgments, 317, §782; Ritchie v. 
Landau, 475 F.2d 151 (2nd Cir. 1973); Kreager v. General 
Electric co., 497 F.2d 468 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied 95 s.ct. 
111, (1974); Kamstra v. Bolles, 434 P.2d 539 (Alas. 1967). 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court did not err in granting defendants• 
motion in limine, in refusing to present the issue of informed 
consent to the jury, and in presenting the special verdict form, 
Further, the lower court did not err in granting the 
summary judgment for Mrs. Reiser' s alleged personal injuries and 
for the parents' claim for emotional distress. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of June, 1980. 
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